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Propositionalism is the widely held view that intentional attitudes are fundamentally and 
predicatively propositional. In contrast, objectualism is the view that a particular class of 
intentional attitudes—for example, love, fear, like, and hate—bears no relation to a proposition 
or state of affairs nor does their content make reference to objects by predicating something of 
them. This paper challenges the objectualist view. While I do not deny that non-propositional 
attitudes are real mental states, I do deny that they are metaphysically independent from 
propositional ones. To that end, I proffer an account whereby non-propositional attitudes 
supervene on possible disjunctive complexes of propositional attitudes, and I defend its merits 
over objectualism. I argue that my propositional account provides an intuitive framework to 
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1 INTRODUCTION  
Intentionality refers to the power of particular mental states to have contents—that is, to 
represent or be about certain objects.1 Generally, philosophical discourse on intentionality has 
centered on at least two types of attitude reporting sentences. The first, which has garnered the 
most attention, concerns the cognitive relation an agent bears to a proposition or state of affairs. 
Take, for example, the sentence “Bill believes that Ted is part of the fledgling rock band, ‘Wyld 
Stallyns’.” Here, the agent, Bill, possesses a belief-attitude towards a proposition which is 
expressed by a sentence (viz., that Ted is a member of a band). The content of Bill’s attitude is 
the proposition towards which his attitude is directed. The second attitude reporting sentence has 
to do with the cognitive relation an agent bears to an individual or object. When one says, “I love 
so-and-so,” her love-attitude makes reference to the individual(s) towards which her attitude is 
directed, without predicating anything of them and/or without relating the agent who bears the 
attitude to a proposition about the object of her love. In this way, the content of the agent’s love-
attitude is just the object of her attitude, tout court. 
The dissimilar attitude reports described above reflect a larger debate concerning the 
nature of cognitive attitudes. Most philosophers are “propositionalists”. They assume (either 
explicitly or implicitly) intentional states, like the attitudes, are fundamentally2 propositional and 
have predicative3 structure, such that their content is evaluable by some standard, be it truth, 
 
1 For a brief history and discussion of the nature of intentionality, see George Bealer, “Materialism and the Logical 
Structure of Intentionality,” in Objections to Physicalism, ed. Howard Robinson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1993), 101-26. 
2 Most propositionalists assume that the propositional content of propositional attitudes has explanatory primacy 
over other content that may be constitutive of the attitude or other content that may be derived from the 
propositional content of the attitude. It is, perhaps, an open question whether all propositional attitudes are 
essentially propositional, since there is disagreement over whether their object(s) is best construed as a proposition 
or whether they even take an object (c.f., Sellars, 1956; Kiteley, 1964).  
3 It is important to bear in mind that the predicative elements of structured propositional attitudes may be located at 
different levels: solely at the state level, or at both the state and content level. 
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accuracy, veridicality, or satisfaction. While this may be the standard view, it has recently found 
a variety of opponents. Alex Grzankowski,4 Michelle Montague,5 and Paul Thagard,6 to name a 
few, are all, in some sense, “objectualists” or “non-propositionalists”. They argue that a 
particular class of intentional attitudes—for example, love, fear, like, and hate—are essentially 
non-propositional. Such attitudes bear no relation to a proposition or state of affairs nor does 
their content make reference to objects by predicating something of them.7 As a result, 
objectualists think their content can neither be analyzed in terms of propositions nor can they be 
evaluated according to some standard such as those listed above.  
To clarify, what is fundamentally at issue is whether provisions regarding intentional 
state contents require a “that”-clause, which inevitably involves an appeal to propositions or 
states of affairs.8 Propositionalists think intentional states call for such an appeal, while 
objectualists do not. One goal of this thesis is to examine the relationship between propositional 
and non-propositional attitudes in an attempt to explicate the nature of this appeal and determine 
whether it is reasonable. To that end, I aim to show that current non-propositional theories have 
not properly individuated polysemous non-propositional attitudes nor have they the resources to 
explain and predict a variety of intentional behaviors. I argue objectualists are at a considerable 
disadvantage since propositionalists can meet these individuative and explanatory demands, and, 
as a result, provide an intuitive framework to index cognitive states and their relations to one 
another.  
 
4 Alex Grzankowski, “Not All Attitudes are Propositional,” European Journal of Philosophy 23, no. 3 (2012): 374-
91. 
5 Michelle Montague, “Against Propositionalism,” Nous 41, no. 4 (2007): 503-18. 
6 Paul Thagard, “Desires Are Not Propositional Attitudes,” Dialogue 45, no. 1 (2006): 151-56.  
7 Following Evans (1982), one may argue that we cannot think about an object without also conceiving of that 
object as having certain properties. The objectualist may concede this point, but they will also argue that there is a 
reasonable sense by which we can think of objects without also thinking of an object’s properties. 
8 Alex Grzankowski, “Non-Propositional Intentionality: An Introduction,” in Non-Propositional Intentionality, eds. 
Alex Grzankowski and Michelle Montague (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), 3.  
3 
My thesis proceeds as follows. In § 2, I introduce objectualism, delineating its main 
assumptions and distinguishing it from propositionalism. I have done this, briefly, but additional 
exposition is required to secure a common foundation upon which to build. In § 3, I raise a 
methodological concern for non-propositionalism. As I see it, objectualists have taken for 
granted that the existence of expressions with non-propositional structures in language—
expressions like “X loves Y”—bespeaks the existence of attitudes with non-propositional content 
in psychology.9 But this link has not yet been established. Since language is used in diverse 
ways, and there are a variety of semantic phenomena that muddle things (e.g., polysemy and 
ellipsis), it can be quite difficult to determine whether expressions convey information about one 
kind of attitude as opposed to another and whether matters of linguistics even have direct bearing 
on the metaphysical issues concerning (non-)propositionalism. We should be careful then not to 
read expressions and draw psychological conclusions solely on that basis. 
In § 4, I raise two objections to non-propositionalism. The first concerns whether 
objectualists can individuate non-propositional attitudes without appealing to propositionalism. 
The second concerns whether non-propositional attitudes can explain behaviors without 
appealing to propositionalism. I argue that it fails on both accounts, and such a failure threatens 
the explanatory usefulness of the theory. In § 5, I situate myself within the current dialectic by 
adopting a form of propositionalism. I do not deny that non-propositional attitudes are real 
mental states. What I do deny is that non-propositional attitudes are metaphysically independent 
from propositional ones.10 In contrast to objectualists, I argue that non-propositional attitudes—
specifically the ones identified above—supervene on possible disjunctive complexes or sets of 
 
9 Montague, “Against Propositionalism,” 504. 
10 Objectualists are committed to metaphysical independence. They do not think there is a constitutive or conceptual 
connection between propositional and non-propositional attitudes. 
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propositional attitudes (e.g., beliefs, hopes, desires, expectations, imaginings, emotions, and so 
forth), but may also be multiply realized to capture attitudinal variation. When one says, “I love 
so-and-so,” for example, I take it that the agent’s love-attitude is a distinct cognitive relation 
between herself and the qualities—recognized via propositional complexes—which are 
possessed by the attitude-directed object(s). Since there are several important ideas embedded in 
this example, I spend most of § 5 unpacking this supervenient account. One of its merits, I think, 
is its potential for reconciliation. Since non-propositional attitudes are real, objectualists get what 
they want (in some sense); and since non-propositional attitudes are “built out of” propositional 
ones, propositionalists get what they want.   
However, some objectualists may still resist, insisting that non-propositional attitudes are 
fully autonomous (i.e., metaphysically independent) cognitive states. Grzankowski has the most 
developed account of non-propositional attitudes, so, in § 6, I respond to his primary objections 
to propositionalism. § 7 concludes. As I mentioned earlier, my main contribution to this debate is 
to challenge the idea that current non-propositional theories, in light of their core assumptions, 
can account for the polysemy of non-propositional attitudes and explain a variety of intentional 
behaviors. Propositionalism can meet these demands while objectualism cannot, so the former 
appears to be a better intentional theory.  
  
5 
2 SETTING THE STAGE: SOME DISTINCTIONS AND ASSUMPTIONS 
The debate concerning whether some intentional attitudes are non-propositional is 
populated by two conflicting camps. One camp, those who endorse “propositionalism”, commit 
themselves to a metaphysical thesis whereby intentional attitudes are assumed to be states or 
events which relate agents to something that is propositional or proposition-like—something that 
is, as Michelle Montague points out, “essentially discursive in form…perspicuously conveyed by 
verb-involving sentences.”11 Consider a few examples: Frank believes that the sky is blue, Ed 
perceives that he is in danger, Margo desires that she gets the job, and Sally imagines that 
dragons exist. Beliefs, perceptions, desires, and imaginings, such as these, are paradigmatic 
propositional attitudes, since they each express a distinct way in which a subject term (e.g., 
Frank, Margo, etc.) is cognitively associated with a structured proposition or “that”-clause (e.g., -
that the sky is blue, -that dragons exist, etc.).1213 While the nature of these attitudes lends itself to 
considerable interpretation and/or disagreement, it is generally acknowledged that because their 
content is propositional, they are evaluable (i.e., they have conditions of satisfaction). As 
previously noted, an agent possesses an attitude when she is in a certain mental state, such as a 
perceptual-state or a belief-state. But an agent’s attitude is satisfied when its content—the 
represented proposition—is true or accurate (in the case of belief), fulfilled or realized (in the 
case of desire), veridical (in the case of perception), executed (in the case of intention), and so 
 
11 Montague, “Against Propositionalism,” 503. 
12 Sometimes a “that”-clause may not follow a propositional attitude verb. Bill may say, for instance, “I desire a new 
guitar.” While this sentential expression does not look like a typical propositional attitude ascription, it is often 
analyzed as one. Most think Bill’s claim is just a covert way of saying, “I desire that I have a new guitar.” For a 
brief discussion of this type of analysis, see John Searle, “Are There Non-Propositional Intentional States?,” in Non-
Propositional Intentionality, eds. Alex Grzankowski and Michelle Montague (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2018), 259-271. 
13 For alternatives to structured propositionalism, see Robert Stalnaker, Inquiry (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1984) and 
David Lewis, On the Plurality of Worlds (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell Press, 1986). My arguments do not rely on any 
particular view of propositionalism. 
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forth. To illustrate, a person’s belief that Minnesota is North of Iowa is true or accurate when 
Minnesota is North of Iowa and false or inaccurate when Minnesota is not North of Iowa. 
Likewise, my desire that I run a marathon is fulfilled or realized when I run a marathon and 
unfulfilled or unrealized when I don’t run the marathon. In both cases, the content of the attitude 
is the proposition to which the attitude is directed. And since propositions are assumed to be the 
bearers of truth and falsity, reflecting the way things are at a particular world, they are evaluable. 
The opposing camp, which operates under the moniker “objectualism” or “non-
propositionalism”, either denies propositionalism about several intentional attitudes and/or 
argues that some attitudes are essentially non-propositional. Michelle Montague14 and Alex 
Grzankowski,15 for instance, deny propositionalism about loving, hating, fearing, and liking;16 
and Paul Thagard17, Talbot Brewer18, and William Lycan19 deny propositionalism about 
desiring.20 They argue such attitudes do not represent the same as a proposition or state of affairs. 
Instead, they are metaphysically distinct. 
To understand why objectualists deny propositionalism about certain intentional attitudes, 
it is helpful to examine their core assumptions. I focus on the three most prominent in the 
literature. Consider a few sentences: Scott loves Marie, Johnny fears the Bogeyman, Yasmin 
likes a unicorn, and Humphrey hates his neighbor’s dog. These sentences express intentional 
 
14 Montague. “Against Propositionalism,” 503-518.  
15 Grzankowski, “Not All Attitudes are Propositional,” 374-91; See, also, Alex Grzankowski, “Non-Propositional 
Attitudes,” Philosophy Compass 8, no. 12 (2013): 1123-37; Alex Grzankowski, “Attitudes Towards Objects,” Nous 
50, no. 2 (2014): 314-28; Alex Grzankowski, “Limits of Propositionalism,” Inquiry 59, no. 7 (2016): 819-38; Alex 
Grzankowski, “A Theory of Non-Propositional Attitudes,” in Non-Propositional Intentionality, eds. Alexander 
Grankowski and Michelle Montague (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), 134-51; and Alexander Grzankowski, 
“Non-Propositional Contents and How to Find Them,” Journal of Consciousness Studies 25, no. 3-4 (2018): 233-41. 
16 Montague is also an objectualist about hope, wonder, contemplation, adoration, missing, and mourning. 
17 Paul Thagard, “Desires Are Not Propositional Attitudes,” 151-56. 
18 Talbot Brewer, “Three Dogmas of Desire,” in Values and Virtues: Aristotelianism in Contemporary Ethics, ed. T. 
D. J. Chappell (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006): 257-84. 
19 William Lycan, “Desire Considered as a Propositional Attitude,” Philosophical Perspectives 26 (2012): 202-15. 
20 I do not focus on non-propositional desire in this paper since there is good reason to reject it as a non-
propositional attitude. See footnote 11. 
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attitudes which are not evidently directed at a proposition. Instead, they are directed at an object 
or individual without relating the agent who possesses the attitude to a proposition about the 
object. As it goes, Scott may love Marie without loving anything about Marie, that is, any 
proposition about Marie, and Yasmin may like a unicorn without liking any particular aspect of 
the unicorn (e.g., that they are equine creatures, that they are mythical, that they are elusive, etc.). 
Since there is no relation between the agent and a proposition in these cases—since the agent’s 
state, as objectualist’s point out, “represents differently than any proposition”—the content of his 
or her attitude is considered non-propositional.21 This is the objectualist’s first assumption. 
The objectualist’s second assumption concerns predication and evaluability. I noted that 
propositional attitudes are evaluable because their content is propositional. But they (i.e., the 
contents of propositional attitudes) also seem to be predicative. When Frank says, “I believe that 
the sky is blue,” he takes the sky to have a certain property, namely, blueness. Likewise, when 
Yasmin imagines that a unicorn exists, she attributes existence to unicorns for pretensive 
purposes. In both cases, the agent makes reference to a propositional object and predicates 
something of it. But, according to objectualists, predication and evaluability does not apply to 
non-propositional attitudes.22 When Scott loves Marie, for example, his mental state is about 
Marie, but he does not predicate a property to Marie or represent her as being some way. He 
merely brings her to mind.23 Because non-propositional attitudes represent in this way, 
objectualists argue they cannot be evaluated according to some standard. Questions of whether 
Scott’s love is true, Johnny’s fear is accurate, or Humphrey’s hate is satisfied are, as 
 
21 Alex Grzankowski, “Non-Propositional Contents and How to Find Them,” 3. 
22 Alex Grzankowski, “Non-Propositional Attitudes,” 1124. 
23 Ibid., 1124. 
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Grzankowski claims, misplaced.24 Conditions of evaluability do not bear on non-propositional 
attitudes in an appropriate or relevant way. 
Finally, objectualists assume that non-propositional attitudes feature in predictive and/or 
psychological explanations such that they can be brought to bear on our motivations, actions, 
omissions, and behaviors.25 Though Johnny may not represent the Bogeyman as being some 
way, his fear of the Bogeyman may motivate him to act in specific ways. He may, for example, 
conduct himself properly in formal situations or obey the commands of authority figures to avoid 
encountering the Bogyman. And, more somatically, he may break out in nervous sweats, fail to 
get adequate sleep, and experience stress as a result of his fear. From an explanatory standpoint, 
the objectualist insists that Johnny can cite his non-propositional fear as a reason for his well-
mannered behavior. Indeed, Johnny is obedient because he fears the Bogeyman. The objectualist 
also insists that observers can predict Johnny’s behavior by referencing his non-propositional 
fear. One may predict, for example, that Johnny will comport himself or Johnny will experience 
stress because he fears the Bogeyman. In both instances, non-propositional attitudes help us 
explain and predict why agents act as they do in a way that does not obviously appeal to 
something propositional in nature. So, in this regard, non-propositional attitudes do relevant and 
important work to elucidate agential behaviors. 
  
 
24 Ibid., 1124. 
25 Alex Grzankowski, “Limits of Propositionalism,” 821-29. 
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3 A METHODOLOGICAL CONCERN 
Certainly, more may be said regarding non-propositional attitudes, propositional 
attitudes, and their relevant distinctions. But I have provided an adequate framework to proceed. 
I now want to consider a methodological concern I have with the objectualist’s attempt at 
providing a general theory of non-propositional attitudes. As I see it, the relationship between 
linguistic expressions of non-propositional attitudes and the non-propositional attitude 
psychologies to which those expressions supposedly track has yet to be established. To the 
objectualist’s credit, we definitely use expressions like “X loves Y”, “X likes Y”, or “X hates Y” 
in ordinary language. But we should be careful not to read these expressions, and conclude solely 
on their bases, that they provide conclusive psychological evidence (as opposed to linguistic 
evidence) for the existence of non-propositional attitudes or that they even convey meaningful 
information about non-propositional content and its mental representation. This is because 
language is used in remarkably manifold ways. A single expression can communicate thoughts 
that have related but different structures, it can communicate a partial thought that stands as an 
abbreviated version of a related but more complete thought, and it can communicate thoughts 
that are modulated by context. These various uses make it difficult to discern whether 
expressions of non-propositional attitudes convey information about the psychological 
phenomena they supposedly track (viz., attitudes with non-propositional content), or whether 
they really convey information about other phenomena (viz., attitudes with propositional 
content), albeit in irregular or indirect ways. A couple examples may help to illustrate this point.  
Consider first polysemy. This is a phenomenon whereby a single term is associated with 
multiple related senses.26 The term healthy, for example, can denote someone who is in good 
 
26 Polysemy may be contrasted with monosemy, whereby a single term only has one meaning, and homonymy, 
whereby a single term has multiple unrelated senses. For a helpful discussion of polysemy and related phenomena, 
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health (as in “Tara is healthy”), something that promotes health (as in “eating vegetables is 
healthy”), or something that is just indicative of health (as in “a healthy mind”). It is perhaps 
unclear how best to construe the relatedness of polysemous senses, in terms of a core meaning, 
shared features, semantic overlap, or productive rules. But, for our purposes, it is enough to say 
that there is at least some substantive generative system or principle that ties a term’s 
polysemous senses together.  
What I find interesting from a linguistic standpoint is that many terms used in non-
propositional expressions, especially “love” and “fear”, also appear to have polysemous 
natures.27 The term “love”, for example, can express romantic or passionate love for a significant 
other, filial love for a parent, maternal love for a child, platonic or companionate love for a 
friend, or a treasuring-type love for possessions.28 It can also express a type of enjoyment (as in 
“I love to hang out at the beach”), a type of approval (as in “I love your plan”), a type of respect 
or positive regard (as in “I love myself”), a type of comfort (as in “I love it here”), a type of 
feeling (as in “I am in love”), or a type of desire (as in “I’d love for you to tag along”). As above, 
it is unclear how these senses are related to each other and how they are represented in the head. 
But we may reasonably ask whether a general theory of non-propositional attitudes can 
adequately capture and explain polysemous senses, particularly objectual ones, or whether that 
 
see Ingrid Falkum and Agustin Vicente, “Polysemy: Current Perspectives and Approaches,” Lingua 157, no. 1 
(2015): 1-16. 
27 Davis has previously argued that the term “fear” denotes several different, though related, psychological states: 
one is propositional attitude, one is a bodily state, and one is a relation between a person and a non-propositional 
object. C.f., Wayne Davis, “The Varieties of Fear,” Philosophical Studies 51, no. 3 (1987): 287-310. 
28 It is worth noting that other languages may denote polysemous senses of love with other words. In Greek, there 
are words like eros (i.e., romantic or passionate love), ludus (playful love), storge (filial or fraternal love), pragma 
(sensible or rational love), mania (possessive love), and agape (selfless love). C.f., Tim Lomas, “The Flavors of 
Love: A Cross-Cultural Lexical Analysis,” Journal for the Theory of Social Behavior 48, no. 1 (2018): 134-152; Tia 
Xenia, “The Contrastive Componential Analysis of the English Verb ‘to love’,” Journal of Language and Literature 
19, no. 1 (2019): 65-71; and Ellen Berscheid, “Love in the Fourth Dimension,” Annual Review of Psychology 61 
(2010): 1-25. 
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theory, instead, offers only generalizations about a term whose meaning is in some way 
abstracted from its distinct senses such that it functions as a generic catch-all for a range of 
related thoughts, feelings, and behaviors. My contention, which I will discuss in the following 
sections, is that objectualists do something like the latter. They characterize non-propositional 
attitudes univocally and then analyze them as such, without considering whether and how 
polysemy might bear on that analysis. This is a failure on their part not only because it 
oversimplifies a psychological picture that is often messy but also because it dilutes the 
explanatory power of their theory. Since they do not specify polysemous relations, it is not easy 
for them to explain why, for example, two people who love the same object behave in different 
ways towards it. But more on this later. For now, it is worth observing that the same form of 
words—for example, “I love you”—can express a variety of related but different thoughts, and it 
is debatable whether all these thoughts are represented non-propositionally since objectualists 
have neither acknowledged nor analyzed the extent to which non-propositional attitudes are 
polysemous. Upon further investigation, it may turn out that many of the polysemous senses of, 
say, “love” or “like”, are represented propositionally. If so, it may diminish the scope of non-
propositionalism as well as its capacity to provide fruitful explanations and predictions of 
intentional behaviors. 
Now consider elliptical expressions or explanations. An elliptical expression or 
explanation is, more or less, a way of communicating partial or incomplete thoughts about a 
thing—thoughts that stand in relation to a more complete thought about that thing. Most 
expressions are elliptical because they omit information that is blatantly obvious in a context or 
not of especial importance. For instance, one may say, “It is snowing,” if asked about the 
weather in Minnesota, instead of saying, “It is snowing in Minnesota.” While the latter 
12 
expression is more explanatorily complete than the former, it is not used because the speaker 
assumes the hearer will understand the expression in the context to which it is given, perhaps by 
supplementing the expression with elided, though accessible, material.  
It also appears that expressions of non-propositional attitudes can be elliptical. In the 
context of a restaurant, for example, the expression “I like fish” can be an elliptical way to 
express the following thought: I like to have fish for dinner. In different contexts—that of a pet 
store or that of an aquarium—the same expression can be an elliptical way to express other 
thoughts: I like to have fish as pets or I like to observe fish, respectively. As above, the meanings 
of these expressions are apprehended through contextual cues or background knowledge. We 
supplement the expression with the information we need to make sense of it unless we query for 
additional information or are content with ignorance. But, as with polysemy, it is unclear how 
these elliptical expressions are represented in the head. We might be quick to assume that they 
are non-propositional because they are presented as such: there is a supposed non-propositional 
attitude verb flanked by two noun-phrases. But further analysis reveals that, within a given 
context, such expressions are really just rough-and-ready vehicles we use to quickly 
communicate information about more complete propositional thoughts. The result of this 
phenomenon is a “mismatch” between a non-propositional expression and the propositional 
representation that ostensibly grounds it—between, say, an utterance that I like fish and a 
representation that I like it only insofar as I eat it for dinner, or have them as pets, or what have 
you. So, while it is still unclear whether non-propositional expressions reflect attitudes with non-
propositional content, it is likely true that they do not always do. 
To be fair, it is probably premature to claim that all non-propositional expressions are 
either elliptical or polysemous. So, I will, instead, end this section with a more modest claim: 
13 
looks can be deceiving. Though we often encounter expressions that have a non-propositional 
linguistic structure, that does not mean that they reflect or convey information about something 
that is non-propositional. They are, rather, imperfect guides to what is going on in the head. 
Sometimes they offer accurate portrayals of psychological phenomena, but sometimes they do 
not. As a result, we should be careful not to attribute “real” attitudes to people based solely on 
the existence of expressions concerning them. Further detailed studies, using the methods of both 
linguistics and psychology, are needed to make such attributions. 
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4 TWO OBJECTIONS TO NON-PROPOSITIONALISM 
The potential concern I highlight above does not sound the death knell for non-
propositionalism. But I do think there are several objections that call into question its 
explanatory usefulness. I’ll expand on these objections below and then I’ll attempt to resolve 
them with a supervenience account. 
The first objection concerns whether objectualist theories can individuate non-
propositionalist attitudes finely enough to explain or predict a variety of behaviors.29 Recall, non-
propositional attitudes represent things without representing them as being some way. Scott may 
love Marie, for instance, without predicating a property of her. He simply brings her to mind. 
However, this turns out to be problematic when we introduce other elements into the picture. To 
illustrate, suppose an objectualist holds that Scott loves Marie and Ryan loves her, too. We may 
predict, then, that since both Scott and Ryan exhibit similar attitudes towards Marie, they will act 
in similar ways towards Marie. But now suppose that Scott loves that he be near Marie and Ryan 
loves that he tortures Marie. Technically, they love the same thing but, crucially, in ways that 
would generate divergent behavioral predictions and/or explanations. The worry is that since 
non-propositional attitudes do not represent objects as being some way, the objectualist is not 
able to make fine-grained distinctions between Scott and Ryan’s love in order to provide 
adequate descriptions or predictions of their divergent behaviors. So, he is at a considerable 
disadvantage against propositionalists who can easily make distinctions using propositions or 
something proposition-like. 
An initial response may be to distinguish Scott and Ryan’s love according to the different 
reasons they have for their attitudes. Thus, Scott and Ryan may simply love Marie, but they 
 
29 For this objection, see Neil Sinhababu, “Advantages of Propositionalism,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96, no. 
1 (2015): 165-80. 
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behave differently towards her because they have different reasons for their loves: Scott’s reason 
is to be near Marie and Ryan’s is to torture her. The advantage of this response is that it allows 
the objectualist to explain attitudinal differences and divergent behaviors without ceding the 
objectual character of the attitudes since reasons need not be constitutive of the attitudes. They 
are, instead, causal antecedents of the attitudes (i.e., things that lead X to love Y) or after-the-fact 
rationalizations for the attitudes (i.e., explanations for why X loves Y).30 Nevertheless, I think 
this response will end up undermining the objectualist’s case. If we assume that reasons are 
propositions, or mental states with propositional content, or even things that derive from mental 
states with propositional content, and those reasons are required to either individuate non-
propositional attitudes or generate predictions of non-propositional behaviors (i.e., behaviors that 
are a result of non-propositional attitudes), then the objectualist will have to rely on a 
propositional framework to make sense of their theory. The objectualist’s overarching goal is to 
secure a robust theory of intentionality such that non-propositional attitudes are metaphysically 
distinct from propositional attitudes and non-propositional attitudes can themselves feature in 
predictive and/or psychological explanations—not just reasons for those attitudes. But the more 
they surround non-propositional attitudes with other things (e.g., propositional reasons) to make 
sense of intentional behaviors, the more those things get bound together as an explanatory 
complex. The end result is an attitude that is not as metaphysically distinct or as explanatorily 
efficacious as the objectualist would like. It may be best, then, that the objectualist avoids this 
dialectical route. 
A similar response is to embrace both propositional and non-propositional 
characterizations of an attitude (e.g., fear, love, hate, etc.).31 Scott may love Marie, for example, 
 
30 Thanks to Dan Weiskopf for this type of reply. 
31 Grzankowski, “Limits of Propositionalism,” 824-25. 
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but he may also love that he be near Marie. The same goes, mutatis mutandis, for Ryan. With 
this expansion, the objectualist is in a better position to explain why Scott and Ryan act 
differently towards Marie even though they love the same object. So long as the situation draws 
our attention to propositional characterizations of love in addition to non-propositional 
characterizations, there is a sense in which Scott and Ryan’s love is different and a sense in 
which their love is the same.32 All the objectualist needs to do to generate explanations and 
predictions of their behavior is focus on the contents of the former attitudes rather than the 
contents of the latter. 
This reply may resolve the immediate worry, but it suffers the same fate as the first. As I 
see it, an appeal to supplementary propositional attitudes is problematic because it renders non-
propositionalism increasingly superfluous. To the extent the burden of explaining and predicting 
non-propositional behaviors falls on propositional attitudes instead of their non-propositional 
counterparts, there does not seem to be a point in positing the latter. They become more of a 
placeholder, existing in name only, rather than a robust cognitive state which helps to elucidate 
agential behaviors.  
But let us grant, for the sake of argument, that non-propositional attitudes can do some 
(co-)explanatory work with respect to behavior. Even so, it is still unclear how objectualists 
could make sense of graded non-propositional relations without presupposing a propositional 
framework. Consider that Sally may love her partner romantically, her parents selfishly, her 
daughter selflessly, her friend platonically, her fish affectionately, and a book nostalgically. And 
she may love any one of these objects conditionally or unconditionally, a lot or a little, always or 
sometimes, and so on. The fact that love is so motley in character suggests that the attitude may 
 
32 Ibid., 825. 
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not be as categorically univocal as one might assume. Instead, it may be divided into polysemous 
sub-categories, each of which is characterized by patterns of thought and behavior that are 
governed by one or more propositional relation. Such a construal, I think, more accurately maps 
on to the diverse psychological landscape, and it allows for more discrete explanations and 
predictions of behavior. A generic “love”, “hate”, or “fear” does not do much to explain why an 
agent behaves as s/he does. “Because I love so-and-so”, for instance, does not suffice to explain 
why Sally acts romantically towards her partner and non-romantically towards her friend 
provided she loves them both, or why she may act more romantically to one partner as opposed 
to another. If it does, it is empty and uninformative. Sally’s dissimilar behaviors only make sense 
once we have specified the nature of the propositional relation(s) undergirding them. We can 
distinguish Sally’s behavior to her partner from that of her friend by specifying, among other 
things, that she is in a romantic relation towards the former and a platonic relation towards the 
latter. In either case, the nature of the relation gives formative quality to the attitude, such that 
romantic love produces markedly different thoughts, feelings, and behaviors from platonic love. 
The problem is that objectualists cannot specify such relations without appealing to propositions 
or states of affairs. They are stuck, instead, with generic attitudes that inadequately capture 
behavioral nuances—attitudes that may not even be generic to begin with. Of course, they can 
always appeal to the propositional characterizations of non-propositional attitudes. But the 
advantage of propositionalism is that it can already explain non-propositional behaviors without 
positing additional entities, and it does so in a way that is psychologically informative. Non-
propositionalism, on the other hand, relies on propositionalism to get off the ground. It posits 
additional entities, at the cost of parsimony, to proffer uninformative psychological explanations 
that demand further elaboration.  
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The second objection is related to the first. It concerns whether non-propositional 
attitudes can feature in predictive psychological explanations without appealing to propositions. 
The objectualist thinks they can. Consider a few examples from Grzankowski: Lynn will not go 
to the party because only gin is being served and Lynn hates gin, Lex Luthor will avoid the 
Fortress of Solitude because he suspects Superman is there and Lex fears Superman, and Bill 
wants to go to the bar because he heard John will be there and Bill loves John.33 In each case, the 
agent’s motivations for prospective behavior make reference to mental ascriptions that are not 
obviously propositional in nature. It is the non-propositional attitude alone—not some other 
propositional attitude—that does relevant work to elucidate behavior. So, according to the 
objectualist, they should not be considered idle posits or placeholders. 
I disagree with the objectualist. To me, it is not the non-propositional attitude that 
explains why an agent behaves in a particular way. More likely, it is the specific, predicated 
qualities of the object, a state of affairs surrounding the agent, or some further propositional 
relation that explains why. Consider the examples once more. We could just as well say that 
Lynn will not go to the party because only gin is being served and she hates the taste of gin, or 
that Lex Luthor will avoid the Fortress of Solitude because he suspects Superman is there and he 
fears the traits of Superman or that his schemes will be thwarted. These formations retain the 
agent’s original motivations, but they have the advantage of providing additional specificity. We 
do not need to settle on a generic or overbroad explanation of why Lynn and Lex behave as they 
do. We can utilize one that provides additional context to their behaviors. Propositional 
construals help us discern what it is about Superman that Lex fears and inevitably causes him to 
avoid the Fortress of Solitude. Of course, the objectualist may be okay with leveraging generic 
 
33 Grzankowski, “Limits of Propositionalism,” 828. 
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explanations of behavior. But, as Sinhababu notes, without specifying certain propositional 
relations, the objectualist is not in a good position to explain why a non-propositional attitude 
does or does not obtain and/or why a non-propositional attitude produces psychological effects in 
one situation but not another.34  
To illustrate, suppose, on a separate occasion, that Lex does not avoid the Fortress of 
Solitude even though he suspects Superman is there and he fears Superman. In this example, it is 
not clear what explains the difference in his behavior unless some relation between Lex and 
Superman has changed. Perhaps his fearful-avoidant behavior is sensitive to whether he can 
exploit a weakness or secure an advantage, or, on the contrary, whether his plans will be 
thwarted. But it is not sensitive to whether he will be apprehended, injured, or even killed. 
Whatever the case, being able to specify these various relations gives us a clearer, more complete 
account of the manifestation conditions regarding non-propositional behaviors. They help to 
illuminate the parameters circumscribing the attitude. Since objectualists cannot reference these 
relations without adopting some form of propositionalism, they must contend with explanations 
that are lacking in specificity and scope. Granted, such explanations are sometimes preferable 
because they are easily communicable. But only up to a point. Their utility is often tied to how 
much contextual information one has access to.35 If one has a lot of information regarding a 
subject and his/her circumstances, then a generic or elliptical explanation of the subject’s 
behavior is preferable only insofar as one is already able to fill in relational gaps quite quickly. It 
would be inefficient to spend considerable time and effort specifying relations provided one is 
already aware of those which are predominately operational. But if one does not have such 
information, then a generic explanation is not preferable for the very fact that one cannot fill in 
 
34 C.f., Sinhababu, “Advantages of Propositionalism,” 175. 
35 Ibid., 170. 
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the relational gaps unless they are specified. In either case, the objectualist will end up relying on 
propositionalism to flesh out behavioral accounts. The result is a loss of explanatory power for 
non-propositionalism, for it no longer offers robust descriptions of why people think, feel, or act. 
It just provides an economical package for such descriptions.  
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5 A SUPERVENIENCE ACCOUNT  
I think we can resolve the aforementioned objections by rejecting the assumption that 
non-propositional attitudes are metaphysically independent from propositional ones. While it 
may be true that non-propositional attitudes represent real mental states, I think such states are 
best understood when situated within a propositional framework that can not only individuate 
them finely enough but also deliver informative explanations for how we think, feel, and behave. 
That said, it is far from clear how propositionalism can account for non-propositional attitudes, 
so I will spend the rest of this paper developing and defending an account that elucidates their 
relationship. My main contention is that non-propositional attitudes supervene on possible 
disjunctive complexes of propositional attitudes. When an agent loves an object, for example, her 
attitude involves a cognitive relation between herself and the qualities—grasped via 
propositional complexes—which are possessed by the attitude-directed object(s). There is a lot to 
unpack, here, so I spend the rest of this section delineating the main assumptions of my 
account.36 Then, in the next section, I defend my account against two protentional objections. 
My first assumption concerns the relata of non-propositional attitudes. As I see it, non-
propositional attitudes involve the cognitive relation an agent bears to an object as well as an 
object’s qualities or states of affairs surrounding that object. This means that to love so-and-so is 
to simultaneously love something about so-and-so. One benefit of incorporating relations to 
qualities or states of affairs is that they place parameters on non-propositional attitudes. Not 
every quality or state of affairs will consistently characterize love or effectuate loving behaviors, 
but some will more than others and in differing ways. An account sensitive to these dynamics not 
only appreciates the fundamental complexities of the attitudes but, as we will see, it also gives us 
 
36 I will focus on the non-propositional attitude of love. But my assumptions also apply to fear, hate, and liking. 
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a way to individuate familial and nonfamilial attitudes finely enough to explain patterns of 
behavior. To be sure, it is an open empirical question as to which relations and behaviors are 
commonly (dis)associated with love. But my account remains neutral to that question. It simply 
allows us to fill in relations when there is evidence to support their existence and then analyze 
behavioral data in light of those relations. Without specifying such relations, we encounter many 
of the problems that face non-propositionalism: we have no way to explain why a given non-
propositional obtains and why it produces select behaviors in select contexts.  
According to my second assumption, objectual qualities and states of affairs are grasped 
and appreciated via a complex (or complexes) of propositional attitudes. One comes to know and 
love that her dog is loyal, for instance, by having a complex of perceptions, beliefs, desires, and 
so forth, which express that fact. This assumption gives us a way to trace the developmental 
history of a non-propositional attitude and it helps to explain why some elements of an attitude 
change, progress, or remain stable over time. To illustrate, suppose we discover that an agent no 
longer loves her dog because she no longer believes her dog is loyal. This tells us that the agent’s 
love was at least partly dependent on her belief for its sustainment. My account can readily 
capture these types of dependencies because it incorporates propositional attitudes. We need only 
look at changes within the propositional complex to explain changes in the attitude, for the latter 
supervenes on the former. Non-propositionalism, on the other hand, cannot explain attitudinal or 
behavioral changes because it cannot specify relations beyond those that are purely objectual.  
It follows from my first two assumption that since non-propositional attitudes involve 
relations to objectual qualities, they are associated with propositional complexes and/or 
interactions among and between propositional complexes. I think that it is in virtue of believing 
certain things about an object (e.g., that the dog is loyal), imagining certain things about an 
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object (e.g., that the dog will comfort an agent when she is sad), perceiving certain things about 
an object (e.g., that the dog is cute), desiring certain things about an object (e.g., that the dog will 
be the agent’s companion), and so forth—and in virtue of possible interactions between 
propositional attitudes and/or sets of propositional attitudes (e.g., interactions between beliefs, 
desires, imaginings, etc.)—that the agent bears a distinct attitude towards the object (viz., her 
love of the dog). To be sure, a single non-propositional attitude need not be associated with one 
particular complex, such that any agent who does not grasp or entertain that particular complex 
cannot be in a state of love. Rather, a single non-propositional attitude may be multiply realized 
such that it can be associated with many different complexes. This leaves us room to specify 
differences in people, but it still allows us to accommodate commonalities. We may discover that 
all states of love have a type of belief-desire interaction at their core, but that each individual 
state is distinguished by a host of other interactions that impinge on the core, or the strength of 
the interaction between the belief and the desire, or the contents of the beliefs and desires, etc. Or 
we may discover that while some types of love are characterized by a rigid belief, other types 
lack a belief altogether. Being able to specify these differences enables us to capture the 
polysemy of many non-propositional attitude verbs, since all verbs will likely be associated with 
different complexes (e.g., platonic love may lack a type of desire that is characteristic of 
romantic love). And such specification may help to explain strength of attitude, since differences 
may depend on variances in how complexes interact or the level of connectivity that exist among 
or between complexes. 
Let us stop and take stock. If you recall, the two objections leveraged against non-
propositionalism concern whether it can individuate non-propositional attitudes finely enough 
and whether it can explain a variety of behaviors. With the addition of supervenience, 
24 
objectualists now have the resources to effectively respond to both of these objections. They can 
flexibly individuate non-propositional attitudes according to the propositional complexes that 
they are built out of as well as the composite interactions among and between said complexes. 
And they can offer informative explanations and predictions of behavior by appealing to 
objectual qualities and objectual states of affairs rather than the object itself. The draw of 
supervenience, then, is that it can restore the explanatory power of objectualist accounts. But the 
trade-off is that objectualists must concede that both non-propositional attitudes and 
propositional attitudes are not fully autonomous (i.e., metaphysically independent) cognitive 
states. This does not mean that they must concede that non-propositional attitudes are not real 
states. They just have to reexamine its relationship to other states.  
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6 OBJECTIONS TO NON-PROPOSITIONAL SUPERVENIENCE 
Some objectualists, like Grzankwoski, may want to resist examining non-propositional 
attitudes in light of propositionalism. So, in this section, I identify and respond to two objections 
to my account. The first objection states that non-propositional attitudes cannot be analyzed in 
terms of propositions or propositional attitudes because any propositional formulation that is 
introduced (e.g., substituting X loves that Y is such and such for X loves Y) will either 
mispredict or overpredict what is represented by the non-propositional attitude. As an 
illustration, consider the following examples: Bill fears a man and Jones loves a woman. 
Grzankowksi argues that these non-propositional attitudes only have specific readings because 
they relate an agent to a particular/specific object or individual.37 For Bill to fear a man, for 
instance, it must be the case that he fears a particular man (John or James, perhaps). The same 
goes, mutatis mutandis, for Jones. But, notice, that any propositional complement of such 
attitudes—like Bill fears that a man is out to get him, or Jones loves that a woman is pretty—will 
always allow for non-specific readings because there is no particular object or individual at issue. 
While it may be true that Bill fears that a man is out to get him, there need not be a particular 
man that he fears since anyone could theoretically fit the bill (pun unintended). Grzankowski 
argues that these non-specific readings are overpredicted. They result in an ascriptive attitude 
inequivalence, which means non-propositional attitudes cannot be analyzed propositionally. 
I think there are several counterexamples to the claim that non-propositional attitudes 
only have specific readings. Here are a few: Bill fears dogs, Bill likes the color red, Bill loves 
squareness, Bill hates politics, Bill loves the smell of flowers, Sally hates someone who is in love 
with her, and Sally loves whoever pursues her. The range of “objects” in the examples I proffer, 
 
37 Grzankowski, Alex. “Limits of Propositionalism.” Inquiry 69, no. 7 (2016): 819-38. 
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here, include kinds, properties, determinables, determinates, and other functional roles. They are 
intended to represent cases wherein a non-propositional sentence has a non-specific reading in 
addition to a specific one. Take the last example, for instance. On a de re interpretation, 
“whoever” is specific in that it picks out a particular individual that Sally has in mind. But on a 
de dicto interpretation, “whoever” is unspecific. It does not pick out a particular person, but 
rather anyone who pursues Sally. Bill’s fear of dogs is another example that is ambiguous 
between a specific and non-specific reading. While it may be true that Bill fears a particular dog, 
he may just as well fear dogs qua natural kind, such that any unspecific creature that exhibits the 
intrinsic properties that are common to dogs causes him fear. Grankowski’s thesis is that “for any 
sentential completion that the propositionalist offers, a non-specific reading that isn’t supposed 
to be available will become available” (my emphasis).38 As I have shown, though, there is at 
least one non-propositional attitude that has a non-specific reading available to it. So, there is 
reason to reject his thesis.  
The second objection states that non-propositional attitudes do not supervene on 
propositions or propositional attitudes, because there are no propositional attitude candidates that 
are sufficient for every non-propositional attitude.39 As an illustration, consider the following 
example from Grzankowski: 
Suppose that if Jim likes Jackie this requires that Jim stand in some propositional 
attitude relation or other to some proposition or other concerning Jackie. But what 
propositional attitude will meet the requirement? One might suggest that Jim 
wouldn’t like Jackie if he didn’t think she existed, so perhaps believing that 
Jackie exists could serve as a first pass suggestion. But is this belief sufficient for 
 
38 Ibid., 838. 
39 For this objection, see, Grzankowski, “Not All Attitudes are Propositional,” 383-86. 
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Jim’s liking of Jackie? Quite obviously it is not. But how might we do better? Jim 
believes that Jackie is nice? Jim likes that Jackie is kind? Let us just grant that 
both are true of Jim. Not only are they probably not necessary, but 
counterexamples to their sufficiency are still forth-coming. And combining the 
candidates doesn’t seem to help: Jim believes that Jackie is kind, he hopes that 
she gets a good job, he likes that she helps the needy, but for all of that, he can’t 
stand her. With just a bit of reflection, it strikes one that offering a sufficient 
condition in every case is anything but easy.40  
The objectualist will claim that no matter what propositional attitudes we attribute to Jim, they 
will not be enough to satisfy his non-propositional liking. Thus, supervenience appears to be a 
non-starter. Such an account should be able to offer us a set of minimally sufficient conditions 
upon which propositional attitudes elicit non-propositional attitudes, but it cannot.   
I somewhat agree with Grzankowski. One propositional attitude or a small combination 
of propositional attitudes does not seem to be sufficient for a non-propositional attitude. In my 
view, it is a variety of disjunctive propositional complexes that are sufficient. Grzankowski 
underestimates the complexity of non-propositional attitudes as well as the extent to which 
different types of attitudes co-mingle to manifest various behaviors. While it may not be the case 
that one belief (or belief-desire combination) “makes” a non-propositional attitude, it may be the 
case that a variety of conditional beliefs, desires, imaginings, expectations, emotions, and so 
forth—all interacting with each other—make a non-propositional attitude.41 Similarly, while one 
 
40 Ibid., 383-84. 
41 Here, it may be worth pointing out the similarities between my view and both the dispositionalist and functionalist 
views. Dispositionalists, like Ryle, observe that mental states are best construed as “multi-track” dispositions in that 
they are tied to multiple triggering manifestation conditionals. Functionalists, like Fodor, observe that mental states 
are best construed as causal roles (i.e., sensory inputs, behavioral outputs, interactions, etc.) within a given cognitive 
system. My account just substitutes dispositions and causal roles for clusters of propositional attitudes, at least 
regarding one type of mental state (i.e., non-propositional attitudes). C.f., Gilbert Ryle, The Concept of Mind 
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propositional attitude (or belief-desire combination) may not be sufficient for being in a non-
propositional attitude category, like love, that does not mean a propositional attitude or complex 
is not sufficient for being in sub-categories of love (e.g., platonic love, romantic love, etc.), 
which may or may not exhaust the category. If so—if the polysemy of non-propositional attitude 
verbs does correspond to a bunch of sub-attitude states—then we would not expect there to be a 
single sufficient condition for being in a non-propositional attitude state. Instead, we would 
expect multiple sufficient conditions, each corresponding to a different sub-category.  
Remember, too, that on my account non-propositional attitudes are multiply realized such 
that a single non-propositional attitude can be realized by more than one type of propositional 
complex. This means that there may not be one global-type propositional complex that is 
sufficient for one to be in a non-propositional attitude state. Rather, each person may have their 
own local-type propositional complex that is sufficient for them to be in a non-propositional 
attitude state. Thus, my love may involve beliefs, desires, and so on. But your love may involve 
different beliefs, desires, and so on, or maybe even no beliefs. 
I think part of the difficulty with specifying sufficient elicitation conditions has to do with 
the complexity of the attitudes. We simply do not know enough about the attitudes to make 
adequate judgements or generalizations about them, especially ones as rich and polysemous as 
love. This does not mean that we cannot make them. It just means we ought to be more careful 
when we do. Nevertheless, if the objectualist wants to object to my supervenience account on the 
grounds that the manifestation conditions for non-propositional attitudes are complicated messes 
of states, then I have two responses. First, I would point out that complexity is not really a new 
 
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1949).; and, Jerry Fodor, Psychological Explanation (New York: 
Random House Press, 1968). 
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problem.42 It bedevils any theory of mind. The functionalist, for example, has difficulty 
specifying causal roles because it is quite complicated to determine all the sensory inputs, 
behavioral outputs, and interactions that are associated with a single mental state, like pain, let 
alone many. The same goes, mutatis mutandis, for dispositionalists and identity theorists. Of 
course, it would surely be nice to have a set of conditions for any given mental state, but since 
said states are potentially multi-track, overlapping, disjunctive, and/or multiply realized, we 
ought to acknowledge the long road it will take to get to that point. We cannot simply throw a 
bunch of conditions at the proverbial wall and hope that something sticks. Second, I would argue 
that objectualists have not given any sufficient conditions for non-propositional attitudes, either. 
They claim that they are metaphysically distinct states, and then place the burden on 
propositionalists to come up with propositional analyses of them. But they are reluctant to 
provide their own non-propositional analyses of how we come to be in such states or what it is to 
be in such states. My guess is that if they try to work out the details, they will quickly realize that 
it is not so simple. The conditions they posit will not be any less complex than the ones the 
propositionalists posit, and it is perhaps naïve to think otherwise. 
  
 




The purpose of this paper has been threefold: first, to argue that sentential expressions of 
non-propositional attitudes may not always reflect non-propositional attitude psychologies if the 
former are polysemous or elliptical; second, to argue that current non-propositional theories have 
neither the resources to individuate non-propositional attitudes nor the resources to explain and 
predict a variety of intentional behaviors; and, finally, to argue that such resources become 
available if non-propositional attitudes supervene wholly on propositional attitude clusters. To be 
sure, the limitations of a supervenient approach are unclear given the inherent complexity that 
goes along with it. But, right now, it has the advantage of being able to account for the 
polysemous senses of non-propositional attitudes according to the propositional complexes out 
of which they are built. And it offers more specific and/or complete descriptions of human 
psychology because it has various propositional relations and interactions at its disposal. So, 
unless there is good reason to reject my propositional account, it appears to be a more successful 
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